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 ‘Daily Wanting’ in Dementia Care
Then,1 finally, Ella Veenstra2 gets out of bed, and walks to her bathroom. 
Ella, as her care workers affectively call her, is living with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease in a Dutch sub-urban care home called ‘Zonneweide’.3 She moved 
here six years ago, when she was no longer able to manage by herself. That 
Ms Veenstra gets up in the morning is the result of a lot of work on the part 
of her care workers. Every day anew, when asked to get up, she insists on 
staying in bed, stating that she has a headache. Indeed, Ms Veenstra is 
known to have had migraines for most of her life and is given a light pain 
killer every morning and ‘more if necessary’. However, so her care workers 
tell me, her headaches ‘may have become a bit of an excuse to not get up’. 
Her caregivers check her perspiration and her eyes to determine when she 
‘really’ has a headache. When the care worker on duty thinks she does not, 
she4 starts to encourage Ms Veenstra to get up, acting on the team’s agree-
ment that it is best for Ms Veenstra to get out of bed: once she is up, she 
eats with the other residents and forgets about wanting to stay in bed. 
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Sometimes Ms Veenstra goes back to bed after breakfast, and her care giv-
ers agree that doing so should be allowed. In talking about situations like 
getting Ella up, care worker Anja tells me: ‘This is the difficulty with care 
work, especially with people with dementia.’ She gives me other examples: 
‘[Another resident] always says “Let me stay in bed, let me stay in bed”. 
[…] But she eats better when she is up—then she sits upright; she drinks 
better; she reads a paper and participates in activities. Then one sees that 
getting up has an added value. With people with dementia you typically 
have to make choices for them, because they cannot do that anymore.’ I 
push the conversation: ‘But they do make a choice, only not the one that is 
right in your eyes.’ Anja retorts: ‘I could follow [her] choice, but then I 
know I am not providing good care. […].’ I ask: ‘So it is about good care?’ 
upon which Anja answers: ‘Yes, good care is the basis. Taking one shower 
per week is really the minimum. There is another lady who has a trauma 
from showering because she once stood under boiling hot water. In that 
case, she really does not have to shower; I’ll wash her instead. […] I would 
not coerce her to get into the shower.’
These stories are examples of situations that many caregivers working in 
dementia care homes will recognise immediately: the resident wants some-
thing that the care worker thinks is not good for her. In other words, what 
a resident wants (here, to stay in bed) does not always align with what the 
caregiver wants (here, if the resident does not seem to have a migraine, to 
get the resident up, and, ideally, for the resident to want this as well).5
While the tension between opposing desires is certainly not unique to 
dementia care, it is characteristic for care encounters with those living with 
decreasing mental capacities. With the progression of the dementia, the 
person living with the condition requires increasing levels of assistance to 
complete everyday bodily tasks: she will need more help with getting up and 
being washed and dressed. Some people simultaneously lose their awareness 
of the need to get up and keep clean. Although staying in bed and refraining 
from washing is possible for some days, doing so for longer may come to 
harm one’s health and well-being. Therefore, accomplishing the tasks of get-
ting residents up and washed falls to care workers. This sometimes results in 
situations in which residents refuse to get up, do not want a shower or want 
to wear their favourite shirt while their care worker finds it too dirty to 
wear.6 Studies on care work have pointed out that care workers often call 
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residents who do not want the same as themselves in activities of daily living 
(ADL) care encounters ‘difficult’ or exhibiting ‘challenging behaviour’ (e.g. 
Higgs and Gilleard 2015, pp. 89–90). But they frequently stop short at 
unpacking how this encounter plays out when it presents itself.
To want something is an expression of subjectivity, and being respected 
in one’s desires is as much part of living a good life in a dementia care 
home as it is elsewhere. But how can we think about what residents want 
in cases which lead their care workers to assert that what a resident wants 
is not good for her? Indeed, if care were just about ‘getting the job done’ 
then the way it is done would not be relevant. In practice, however, this 
clearly matters. As care worker Cici remarked: ‘As a normal human being 
you do not want to be forced all the time!’ Similarly, one may not want 
to be left to one’s fate all alone either. Indeed, there is a lot in between.
This is not to say that coercion or neglect never happens in care work. 
When Ms Lichthart woke up covered in her own faeces, but was never-
theless resisting a shower, two care workers held her in a tight grip while 
another washed her quickly. It seemed ‘the only way to do this’. Ms 
Lichthart indeed needed a shower, but by washing her this way, what she 
wanted was overruled. Yet, rather than concluding that ‘things are not 
going well in care’ because these situations do occur, I want to emphasise 
here that such generalisations about care work miss something: they miss 
the work that care workers do on a daily basis to prevent these extreme 
measures. This work becomes most visible in situations in which what a 
resident wants is opposed to what a care worker wants.
Debates on the will are an obvious starting point to take a closer look at 
these situations. Thinking about the will has long been the domain of phi-
losophers. In the most general sense, philosophers have understood the will 
as the ‘“faculty, or set of abilities, that yields the mental events involved in 
volition”, where volition is understood to be “a mental event in the initia-
tion of action”’ (Brand 1995, p. 843 in Murphy and Throop 2010, p. 7). 
Debates on the topic have focused on the (in)compatibility of relative free-
dom and determinacy of human choice and action. Within these debates, 
moral philosophers attach particular value to the free will. After all, whether, 
or to what extent, we can act freely informs whether we have a choice to act 
in a good or bad way in the first place. Put differently, without a will that 
is free (at least to some degree), moral decision making is not possible.
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Dementia care presents an interesting case to think about ‘the will’, as 
dementia is usually said to invalidate it altogether. For instance, Dutch law 
uses the term ‘wilsonbekwaam’ (which translates freely to ‘will- incompetent’7) 
for those who are unable to understand or deliberate on information that is 
provided to them, who cannot make a decision and/or who no longer 
understand the consequences of their decisions (Rijksoverheid 2014). This 
legal category dismisses the person’s will, making possible, for example, a 
person’s admission to a nursing home against her will.8
The philosophical and legal accounts both reflect an understanding of 
the will as related to cognition and rationality. This understanding may 
be useful with regard to long-term decision making (which indeed 
becomes increasingly difficult for people with dementia with the progres-
sion of the condition). However, it is less helpful with regard to the ‘daily 
wanting’ on the dementia ward. Indeed, a lot is wanted on the dementia 
ward! How may we think about those situations?
Much anthropological writing can be read as a critique of the ratio-
nal understanding of ‘the will’. In using concepts such as agency, inten-
tionality, motive, desire, wish and motivation, anthropologists are 
perhaps only implicitly speaking about the will, but nevertheless bring 
to light a complex interweaving with emotional and physical states. 
This literature provides a helpful background against which to rethink 
the will in relation to dementia and dementia care, and situations in 
which residents want something different than their caregivers want for 
them in particular. However, this body of work lacks a definitional con-
sensus and thus a common ground for discussion. In their edited vol-
ume ‘Toward an Anthropology of the Will’, Keith Murphy and Jason 
Throop (2010) make considerable steps towards such a consensus. In 
his contribution to the volume, Jason Throop argues that the will is 
experienced as somehow one’s own, goal-directed and effortful (2010, 
p. 34). While this is important when thinking about why what some-
body wants cannot be simply overruled, Throop is right in suggesting 
that there is still
a necessity of shifting from this descriptive phenomenological approach to 
willing to exploring how these various experiential correlates of willing may 
be differently organized, affected and expressed in the context of unfolding 
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social interaction, personal narratives, and reflections upon past, present 
and future experiences. (Throop 2010, p. 49)
In this chapter, I take up Throop’s invitation to think further about 
‘willing’ in interaction. However, as I discuss in more detail in the follow-
ing paragraph, I focus on ‘daily wanting’ instead of willing, as it is worked 
upon in the context of unfolding sociomaterial interaction. Moreover, 
I ask what we may learn about good care from taking a closer look at 
these practices. Based on my ethnography9 of ADL-care situations in 
which residents with dementia often want something other than what 
their caregivers think is good for them, I argue that, rather than coercing 
residents into doing whatever task is at hand, care workers attempt to 
align what residents’ want with what they themselves want (for them). I 
propose the concept of ‘sociomaterial will-work’ to describe this work 
and reflect on its limits and implications. At the same time caregivers may 
come to want something else too; will-work can thus align the wanting 
of residents but also of their caregivers.
 Work on Wanting: Sociomaterial Will-Work
Before going into the ethnography of ADL encounters in which wanting 
is aligned, I want to highlight two methodological interventions that I 
make with this chapter. Firstly, I contend that the term ‘will’ suggests a 
coherence that hides the relational nature of coming to want something. I 
therefore suggest that, rather than understanding the will as something we 
‘have’, we should understand it as something we ‘do’ in unfolding socio-
material interaction. Secondly, since my interest here is in understanding 
the alignment that is strived for in the process of wanting in dementia care 
settings on a daily basis, I differentiate between ‘willing’ and ‘wanting’. I 
separate a more cognitive intending, pertaining to the realm of the legal 
and long-term decision making (‘willing’), from a more immediate, emo-
tionally and physically informed activity (‘wanting’). I understand want-
ing10 to be a fundamental expression of subjectivity, including activities 
such as desiring, longing, wishing and, significantly, not wanting, which 
is done in unfolding sociomaterial interaction on an everyday basis.
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In defining the will as something we do in sociomaterial interaction, I 
align myself with the tradition of material semiotics, in which practices take 
central stage (Law 2009). I put my writings in conversation with the work 
on care practices (e.g. Jerak-Zuiderent 2015; Mol 2002; 2008; Mol et al. 
2010; Moser 2010a, b; Van Hout et al. 2015; Vogel 2017). Within this 
tradition, I have been particularly inspired by the work of Jeannette Pols 
with patients in psychiatric and residential care. She draws our attention to 
the fact that residents of psychiatric nursing homes, rather than saying what 
they like, make their appreciations known by enacting them (Pols 2005). 
Positing that appreciations can be enacted means that they can be expressed 
both verbally as well as non-verbally. Any interaction may thus include 
gestures, facial expressions and actions. This is important when thinking 
about dementia, as most nursing home residents—whether aphasic, pas-
sive, confused or hallucinating—can and do express whether they want 
something or not. They may do so by softly uttering a ‘yes’, seeking com-
pany or trying to escape it, pushing their plate away or, indeed, by not 
heeding the call to get out of bed. This has a crucial methodological conse-
quence: as residents do appreciations in situations that are co-produced by 
the material environment and other people, they may be observed.11
If wanting is done, as I suggest, in unfolding sociomaterial interaction, 
how it is then acted upon is almost inevitably an ethical and political 
question. As I have mentioned before, wanting is an essential expression 
of subjectivity, and is thus best respected and stimulated. Indeed, avoiding 
coercion was central to many conversations I had with care workers. They 
commonly held the understanding that in order to get residents to ‘coop-
erate’ [meewerken], ‘urging [aandringen] is allowed, but coercing [dwin-
gen] is not’.12 Care workers also told me time and again that ‘[i]f a resident 
really does not want to do something, then she does not have to do it’. The 
distinction that is made between ‘what a resident wants’ and ‘what a resi-
dent really wants’ is an interesting one. Indeed, the word really indicates 
that what is wanted is—at least to some degree—flexible. It is this flexibil-
ity that is used to ‘urge’ residents. The exchange with Anja makes this 
visible: while she says she makes decisions for residents, she adapts her 
way of providing care to them, and what they ‘really’ want, or do not 
want. She thus strives to complete ADL-care without coercion or neglect: 
the resident who is traumatised from standing under boiling water does 
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not have to shower, and Anja washes her by the sink instead. Indeed, care 
workers tried to negotiate with residents if they did not want to do a task 
the care givers asserted needed to be done. Care workers also often proved 
flexible in showering residents at another point in time and giving in to 
residents who, for instance, insisted on wearing certain clothes.
I propose to call the practices in which residents and care workers seek 
to (creatively) align what they both want ‘sociomaterial will-work’.13,14 I 
am indebted to three bodies of work for the concept. First, my choice of 
the word ‘sociomaterial’ builds on the material semiotic tradition. Herein, 
social and material ‘aspects’, previously separated in social sciences, ‘get 
mixed up in ethnographic descriptions of the practices in which they are 
being handled’ (Harbers et al. 2002, p. 208). Second, my choice for the 
word ‘work’ relies on theories of (interpersonal) body work (Gimlin 2007; 
Twigg et  al. 2011; Twigg 2000; Wolkowitz 2002), emotional labour 
(Hochschild 1979, 1983) and sentimental work (Strauss et al. 1982). This 
literature emphasises the dual nature of these types of work (largely organ-
ised as ‘women’s work’) as both a loving attitude and a form of (paid) 
labour. This insight informs the concept of will-work in significant ways: 
will-work is work; it takes time, effort, and skills, and it is a central aspect 
of care giving, which requires an attentive caregiver. The types of work 
described above and will-work can be highly entangled. Acknowledging 
this adds to a more complex understanding of what giving care to people 
with dementia entails. Third, the concept of will-work rests on the shoul-
ders of feminist care ethicists (e.g. Gilligan 1982; Tronto 1993), who have 
advocated for an acknowledgement of peoples’ dependence and interde-
pendency on one another. Will-work is a deeply relational practice: in 
doing will-work care workers rely on relational knowledge, acquired in 
their everyday work with the same people, often for the duration of years. 
In the unfolding interactions, resident and care worker relate to one 
another. Care ethics has been critiqued by disability studies for rendering 
care receivers passive recipients of care (Williams 2001, pp. 478–479).15 
While existing power differences in the care encounter should not be dis-
regarded, the concept of will-work is explicitly not applicable to the work 
of care workers only: care receiver’s wanting may be aligned to having a 
shower, but the caregivers’ wanting may also be aligned to flexibly adjust 
to what the care receiver wants. This could take the form of providing 
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assistance with a shower later, asking another caregiver to step in or per-
haps reconsidering whether the task at hand is necessary at all.
I contend that doing will-work (rather than neglecting or overruling 
residents’ wanting) makes the caregivers’ work good care. Good care 
includes being attentive to people’s desires and striving ‘to lighten what is 
heavy, and even if it fails it keeps on trying’ (Mol et al. 2010, p. 14). Good 
dementia care, then, ‘persistently strives to create conditions for and enable 
better interaction, and also to afford people living with dementia positions 
in which they can act and exert valued forms of subjectivity’ (Moser 2010a, 
p. 295). Coercion or neglect forecloses opportunities for ‘better interac-
tion’. Through coercion, positions in which subjectivity can be exerted are 
not afforded, and wanting can, by definition, not be shared. If wanting 
cannot be done together, and cannot be aligned, it remains unilateral—
which can be harmful in situation where one must agree and where there 
are power differences. In these situations, will-work aims to achieve what is 
good for those living with dementia (an assertion that often relies on pro-
fessional knowledge) in a way that is pleasant for the resident as well as for 
the caregiver. At the same time, it must includes a reflecting upon whether 
the task at hand must be completed now, and in this particular way.
In the remaining pages, I describe the work care workers do on resi-
dents’ wanting as (1) sculpting moods and emotions, (2) managing atten-
tion and (3) creative negotiation involving time and materialities.
 Sculpting Moods and Emotions
The first way in which will-work is done, begins before something is 
wanted. Consider the following interview excerpt:
Annelieke: Can you tell me something about ADL-care and dementia, 
and what is specific for people with dementia, particularly 
when compared to people with somatic complaints?
Leandra: Specific? I think it differs, and depends on the person [you 
are dealing with] and how you deal with it. […] I always 
adjust to how advanced someone is [in his/her dementia].
Annelieke: Hmm. What do you mean? Or—what do you do?
Leandra: You walk in [to the resident’s room] and then you try to 
come in as ‘cheerfully’ [luchtig] as possible.
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Annelieke: Do you mean like [happy tone of voice] ‘Hallo’?
Leandra Yes, you try to brighten up the room when you walk in [het 
zonnetje in huiszijn]. I notice that Ms Koch, […] when I 
go there and I am cheerful, then she also becomes cheerful. 
[I]magine you come in looking all serious, not even sad, 
but just neutral, […] then she is already more sad. So, the 
emotion that you radiate, she magnifies that. [Sometimes] 
you notice that nothing works and that [the fact that she 
does not want to be washed] is due to her mood at that 
moment. […] But I see that it works when I enter happily, 
because it relaxes her and she will allow me to do more. 
This example shows Leandra doing will-work. She wants to shower Ms 
Koch.16 In order to do this, she needs Ms Koch to want to shower, or at 
least to not refuse it. Leandra’s initial use of the generic ‘you’ indicates 
that entering the room cheerfully is a more general way of approaching 
residents. But she then adjusts to the person herself and to the severity of 
the resident’s condition, as is evidenced in Ms Koch’s example. In other 
words, generalisations are not useful here. To get Ms Koch to want to 
shower, Leandra attempts to sculpt her mood. Although sometimes 
‘nothing works’ and wanting remains not amenable to Leandra to work 
upon it, sometimes it does work: in those situations, Leandra’s smile 
causes Ms Koch to ‘also become cheerful’, to ‘magnify the emotion’ and 
to relax. This, in turn, results in her allowing Leandra ‘to do more’, 
including giving her a shower.
In another example of this way of doing will-work, Joani often brought 
three cups of hot chocolate to Ms Veenstra along with her medicine. We 
drank the chocolate by her bedside together. Meanwhile, we talked about 
the weather or what we had done yesterday, or about the joint breakfast 
awaiting her downstairs. By doing this, Joani hoped to get Ms Veenstra 
into the mood for getting out of bed, and it often worked. In those cases, 
what Ms Veenstra wanted was aligned with Joani’s desire for her to have 
breakfast, and for her to be with others.
Sculpting moods and emotions is one way to align wanting. Two 
important conclusions can be drawn from this. Firstly, the story affirms 
that moods and emotions cannot be separated from wanting.17 Secondly, 
it shows will-work as a relational practice: Ms Koch and Leandra are 
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responsive to one another’s moods, smiles and tone of voice. Joani and 
Ms Veenstra first had a chat, after which wanting to get up could become 
a shared desire. Thirdly, materialities, such as cups of hot chocolate or 
breakfast, may be part of the attempt to align wanting.
 Managing Attention
So far, I have described how care workers sculpt moods and emotions 
that then allow residents to want what care workers want for them. 
Sometimes, when Leandra enters the room cheerfully, Ms Koch ‘magni-
fies the emotion’. Leandra’s cheerfulness changes Ms Koch’s mood and 
thus her willingness to take a shower. But ‘coming in cheerfully’ is not 
enough. What do care workers do to keep the wanting aligned once they 
walk through the door? Leandra engages in a second way of will-work 
after she has entered the room cheerfully:
Annelieke: Okay, […] you try to brighten up the room when you walk 
in. […] And then?
Leandra: And then you start instructing [the resident]: ‘what are we 
going to do today’ […] and instead of pausing for a long 
time afterwards [you] talk about other things and […] you 
keep control over the topic of conversation. You have the 
lead in what happens. […] Take Ms Stein, if you tell her 
‘Good morning, I will give you a nice wash’, she will say 
‘yes, but but but […]’. But if you right away talk about 
something else, then the ‘but but’ that you could expect is 
over. Then she is already somewhere else. […] I say: ‘How 
did you sleep?’, ‘Not so well’. Then I say ‘How is that pos-
sible? Was it too warm? Was it too cold?’ ‘Well no, no, I 
don’t know. I don’t know’. ‘Are you hungry?’ ‘Yes, I am 
quite hungry’ ‘Well, then I will [say] ‘look, a wash cloth’ or 
something, you know, ‘Then you can have a nice breakfast. 
What would you like? White bread, brown bread? A whole 
conversation about what is about to happen. […] Well, 
then you are nicely engaged. I am too; I don’t like saying 
nothing. So it is also nicer for […] me. 
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Leandra seems to imply that Ms Stein’s cannot want something other 
than the tasks at hand—being washed while having a conversation. In 
other words, doing wanting (here, not wanting to shower) requires Ms 
Stein’s attention. Doing will-work in this situation entails managing that 
attention: Leandra orients Ms Stein towards what they are going to do, 
away from not wanting to shower, and times her questions to ‘keep con-
trol over the topic of conversation’. In doing so, Leandra keeps Ms Stein’s 
‘yes but’ at bay. By ‘talking about something else’, Leandra can distract 
Ms Stein from the task at hand and let it go almost unnoticed. Leandra 
thus prevents that Ms Stein comes to want something other than a 
shower. When Leandra ‘has the lead in what happens’, Ms Stein is ‘already 
somewhere else’ instead of in her rejection of the washing. Both are ‘nicely 
engaged’. This affects Ms Stein positively: if she is off to a good start, she 
is more likely to enjoy the rest of her day as well.
In a similar vein, Anja manages the residents’ attention by offering a 
choice about the timing of showering, rather than about showering itself:
Anja: My biggest trick is to give people one choice, no discussion. 
I ask […]: ‘would you like to shower now or in half an 
hour?’ Then they feel like they have a say in it, although 
they do not [have a say about whether to actually have a 
shower or not] … ‘It would be nice if you would wear a 
clean shirt today. Do you want this one or that one?’ (She 
holds up her hands as if she is holding two shirts next to 
each other.) Idem ditto with ‘do you want to have a shower 
now or in thirty minutes?’ In fact, they do not get a say. … 
‘Yes…’; ‘That one’ (and she points to one of her hands with 
the imaginary shirt). It simply is a bath-day! Then [when I 
pose this question], they are often so overwhelmed, that 
they just come along. (Emphasis original)
Anja emphasises that, if she does not provide ADL-care, she says that 
she knows she is ‘not providing good care’. Good care, as described by 
Anja here, means to make the resident want what Anja thinks is good for 
her. In providing a binary choice about timing, she offers the resident a 
sense of choice, yet makes sure that she chooses the shower, which Anja 
says is good for her.
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Leandra and Anja manage the resident’s attention to prevent that she 
may come to want something other than what they, as her care workers, 
contend is good for her. One could argue that these ways of doing will- 
work are manipulative.18 If we consider the will to be a fixed entity, it may 
well be. But if, as I suggested, we see wanting as done in unfolding socio-
material interaction (which may include cups of hot chocolate, smiles 
and a cheerful tone of voice, as well as attempts to keep control over the 
conversation), we can understand the attempts to manage attention as 
attempts to turn wanting into a relational activity, rather than an indi-
vidual one: Care workers take what residents want as something that can 
be worked upon and made relational in the care encounter. In doing so, 
care workers take residents’ wanting seriously in that it cannot simply be 
overruled, but neither can it be taken to be a fixed entity which cannot be 
changed. Rather than forcing their will upon residents, care workers 
remain in conversation. They offer a sense of choice where perhaps there 
is none (as Anja put it, it may be ‘simply a bath-day’!19), but do not 
merely impose something on the resident. Managing attention is thus 
part of the larger attempt to align wanting in a way that ensures that care 
tasks that care workers deem necessary get done, in a way that is as pleas-
ant as possible for both people involved. At best, both are ‘nicely engaged’.
 Creative Negotiation Involving Time and Materialities
Leandra enters the room in a friendly mood. She controls the conversa-
tion and diverts the residents’ attention away from coming to want some-
thing other than the care task at hand. Anja offers a choice on time, 
rather than on the task itself. These are ways to work on residents’ want-
ing before they fixate on wanting something. In this section I describe 
how care workers attempt to modify what a resident wants when a resi-
dent already expressed a wanting before it could be sculpted. I call this 
work ‘creative negotiation’.20
First and foremost, care workers ask residents for their ‘cooperation’ in 
the care activity. If this does not work, care workers also reason with resi-
dents, either jokingly or seriously. Herein they often argue based on 
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visible materialities in the present (‘Look, your shirt is dirty’), relating 
them to what is to be done now (‘Let’s put on a clean shirt’) or in the near 
future (‘Don’t you want to look clean when your family visits this after-
noon?’). These strategies seem to appeal to a cognitive willing (resonating 
the philosophical understanding of the will)—which is precisely what 
residents in the early stages of dementia seem to be losing grip on—but 
not to an emotional wanting. Indeed, these strategies do not work with 
all residents, and certainly not every time.
If reasoning does not work, there are other strategies. Care workers, for 
instance, play with the timing of caregiving. When Mr Bakker does not 
want to get up, Joani often asks: ‘Would you like me to come back in half 
an hour?’ If he agrees, she simply helps the residents in a different order, 
creating a temporary alignment between what she and Mr Bakker want: 
to not shower (just yet). Mr Bakker is often willing to get up after half an 
hour or so, perhaps having fulfilled his desire to stay in bed longer, or 
perhaps having forgotten his reluctance to get up in the first place. As 
such, time helps in aligning wanting.21
When continuing attempts to align the residents’ wanting with their 
own become too challenging, care workers sometimes call upon a col-
league to take over. Care workers remain patient with the resident by 
putting space between themselves and a resident whose wanting remained 
not amenable to negotiation. Sometimes a specific colleague is asked. 
This once again highlights the relational nature of will-work: if a care 
worker gets along well with a resident, aligning wanting becomes easier 
to do. For instance, when nobody can get Ms Veenstra out of bed and 
Lucia is working that day, her colleagues ask her to come and help. Lucia 
can ‘pull off’ a stricter approach and ‘get away with it’. She can tell Ms 
Veenstra: ‘My dear, you stink, you must get up’. Anja said: ‘Ms Veenstra 
would get angry at any other care worker for saying anything of the sort, 
but she loves Lucia’.
Like the cups of hot chocolate worked for sculpting wanting, materi-
alities can also play a role in creative negotiation. Take the case of Mr 
Bakker. Convincing Mr Bakker to wear clean clothes and to take a shower 
poses a challenge every day. He is known to feel cold and claustrophobic, 
so that the bathroom door cannot be closed to make him feel warmer. 
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Mr Bakker has vascular dementia and is aphasic: he can utter short sen-
tences, with the occasional loss of a word. Not being able to find and 
understand words frustrates Mr Bakker and reasoning is likely to upset 
him. Joani is particularly skilled22 in finding alternatives to reasoning by 
‘creatively negotiating’ with him, not only verbally, but also non-verbally: 
one day, when faced with his refusal to take a shower, she gave him a foot 
bath. Then he wanted the shower.
In talking about this situation, Joani and I offered differing explana-
tions for why the foot bath had worked. I suspected that giving Mr 
Bakker the foot bath made him feel less cold, undoing his reason to refuse 
the shower. Joani said: ‘The foot bath gets him out of his head. If he puts 
his feet in warm water—maybe he remembers something, that he walks 
down the beach for instance—but once his feet feel the warm water, he 
would have to hold onto his thoughts of “not wanting to shower” very 
rigidly’. Joani imagines that the sensation of warm water on his feet 
reminds Mr Bakker of the ocean. This goes further than to think about 
the ocean: the water makes him feel something he has felt before and thus 
conjures up (hopefully happy) memories. This pleasant feeling, then, in 
her understanding, made him let go of his opposition to showering.
How the foot bath ‘really’ changed Mr Bakker’s wanting is up for spec-
ulation. But two other points illustrate my argument about daily wanting 
and will-work here. Firstly, wanting something seems highly entangled 
with the feeling body, which may then be ‘tinkered with’ (cf. Mol et al. 
2010) in the context of the care relationship. In doing will-work, the feel-
ing body may be skilfully appealed to. Secondly, not only interactions 
between people sculpt or prevent a specific wanting, but so do non- 
human actors: here, work on Mr Bakker’s wanting required a foot bath. 
If the foot bath had not been part of the encounter, Joani could have tried 
cheering up Mr Bakker, arranging another time slot for his care or asking 
one of her colleagues to take over. But instead, the will-work was ‘dele-
gated’ (Latour 1988, p. 299) to the foot bath. Herewith, it becomes clear 
that will-work can be done involving objects: the foot bath creates the 
material conditions that work upon what Mr Bakker enjoys, and in doing 
so, change what Mr Bakker wanted. The foot bath opened up an avenue 
for Mr Bakker to want a shower.
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 Conclusion
In this chapter, I set out to explore in more detail the way in which 
daily wanting is worked upon in the context of unfolding sociomaterial 
interaction in residential dementia care, and I asked what we may learn 
about good care from taking a closer look at these practices. I stated 
that wanting is an expression of subjectivity, and being respected in this 
is a prerequisite for living a good life with dementia. At the same time, 
wanting something is a relational process. How it is acted upon thus is 
an ethical and political question. Nobody wants to constantly be over-
ruled by another person, and indeed much work goes into avoiding 
coercing somebody. To describe what is done instead, I coined the term 
‘sociomaterial will-work’. The concept highlights care workers’ and resi-
dents’ attempts to align the other’s wanting with their own as a form of 
labour and as dependent on sociomaterial relations. I described care 
workers doing will-work by (1) sculpting moods and emotions, (2) 
managing attention and (3) creative negotiation involving time and 
materialities. With smiles, cups of hot chocolate and foot baths, changes 
to the order in which care is provided and to who shows up at a resi-
dent’s bed, care workers strive for a positive way of relating—of being 
‘nicely engaged’ in conversation and activity. Will-work ventures into 
the space between doing nothing and exerting force. It is the ‘urging’ 
that care workers name when seeking alternatives for coercion and 
neglect. I have argued that this aligning residents’ wanting makes the 
caregivers’ work good care.
I have offered an alternative understanding of the will—namely as 
something that is ‘done’ in sociomaterial interaction, in which it can be 
aligned by making it relational. Indeed, instead of dismissing ‘daily want-
ing’ of those living with dementia, my analysis enables thinking about it. 
At the same time, the finding that moods and the feeling body can be 
appealed to in care encounters and that materialities can be used in cre-
ative negotiation with residents, offers new ways of thinking about what 
good care may entail in situations in which residents want something 
that their care workers understand as ‘not good’ for them. As such, my 
contribution is one that can inform care practice.
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Some may say I have painted a rather ideal picture. What can be done 
when ‘nothing works’, which, as Leandra noted, sometimes happens? In 
these cases, will-work seems to hit its limit and coercion may seem the 
only way to get a task done (we may think again of Ms Lichthart, who, 
covered in faeces, resisted a shower). It is important not to forget that 
people living with dementia, who are often aphasic and have a frag-
mented memory, are particularly vulnerable to maltreatment and situa-
tions in which what they want (or resist) is overruled. Doing will-work 
requires the continuous reflection upon the fine line between ‘urging’ and 
‘coercing’. Once, when Ms Veenstra did not want to get out of bed, her 
care worker Linda turned on the TV, radio and shower, and pulled away 
her blankets. These were trying moments of participant observation, as 
being there without doing anything about it made me complicit. Upon 
my inquiry why Linda did this, she explained: ‘This will annoy her so 
much that she will get up. She is better off if she gets up and eats some-
thing’. Paradoxically, Linda was convinced that what she was doing was 
caring. The example shows that a care worker can easily abuse his or her 
power, even if the actions are based on the idea that the resident in ques-
tion is ‘better off’ like this. But the way in which care tasks are achieved 
matters. Coercion, neglect and incisive refusal leave no room for align-
ment in wanting. Wanting, in those situations, remains unilateral and 
cannot be shared. Although coercion does indeed result in Ms Veenstra 
getting up, how this is achieved imposes what Linda wants on her; 
 wanting, instead of being done together, remains unilateral. Indeed, it is 
dubious whether this can still be called good care.
I contend that will-work has failed when a resident is coerced into doing 
something. Sociomaterial will-work makes good care only if care workers 
continue to attempt to align residents’ wanting with what they think is 
good for them, after critically reflecting on the question whether this is 
indeed so. If will-work fails, coercion and neglect remain tragic occurrences. 
But if given enough time, trust and support, care workers doing will-work 
may indeed realise the proverbial ‘otherwise’ (Star 1990, pp.  89–90), 
enabling residents like Ms Lichthart to want the shower that they need.
I do not want to make it seem that care work is easy. On the contrary, I 
explicitly want to acknowledge that persistent tinkering without ‘suc-
cesses’ requires a lot of patience, which under trying circumstances is 
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sometimes sheer impossible. This is why time, energy and motivation are 
indeed essential for retaining the flexibility that is needed to do will-work 
in delicate care situations with frail and fragile residents. Cuts to staff, the 
subsequent increase in work load and a lack of trust within care teams are 
detrimental to the care staff’s ability to do good care. Under such circum-
stances, residents such as Ms Lichthart covered in faeces are sometimes 
forced to shower. At the same time, however, good care is already being 
done. I have taken all examples presented in this chapter from what I have 
seen in the care homes where I conducted my research. In writing about 
these, rather than about the situations in which care falls short, I hope to 
give this work the attention it deserves. I use these examples to hold up to 
others: that way, what already works well, can be done more often.
Notes
1. Like any text, this text is the result of a collaborative effort. I would like 
to extend my gratitude to the Gieskes-Strijbis Fonds for funding this 
research. I owe my deepest thanks to the care institutions which granted 
me access for my fieldwork, and the care professionals and residents who 
gave so much of their time to me, and patiently took me along in their 
daily life and work. In particular, I would like to thank the organisers of 
the summer school that led to this book, Joachim Boldt and Franziska 
Krause, and to the summer school’s participants, whom I can now 
proudly call my esteemed co-authors and friends. Special thanks go to 
Patrick McKearney and my dear colleagues at the University of 
Amsterdam, of whom I want to mention in particular Willemijn 
Krebbekx, Else Vogel, Lex Kuiper, Annekatrin Skeide, my in the 
Anthropology of Care research group Silke Hoppe, Laura Vermeulen, 
Natashe Lemos Dekker and Susanne van den Buusethe members of the 
Writing Care Seminar and the Walking Seminar Amsterdam. Daniel 
Guinness, thank you for editing my English! Lastly, but with emphasis, 
I want to thank my supervisors at the University of Amsterdam: Anne-
Mei The for giving me the opportunity to do this research, and Jeannette 
Pols and Kristine Krause for being such a big source of inspiration and 
support throughout the research and writing process.
2. All names used in this chapter, for sites as well as interlocutors, are 
pseudonyms.
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3. ‘Zonneweide’ (a fictitious name) is one of three care homes in which I 
conducted ethnographic fieldwork. It is a care home in a sub-urban area 
in the Netherlands and home to 50 people with a wide variety of diag-
noses. Fifteen of them live on the floor reserved for people with early 
stage dementia, although, if possible, residents live here until they pass 
away. Recent changes in Dutch health care policy resulted in the closing 
of many of the care homes that are providing care to people with ‘lower’ 
care needs. Those that remain open, like Zonneweide, are increasingly 
providing care to people with ‘higher’ care needs, including those in the 
later stages of dementia.
4. For purposes of legibility, I use the female pronoun to refer to residents 
and care workers in general.
5. The caregivers’ reasons to want something pertain to achieving a high 
level of well-being for the resident in question, and thus doing their job 
well. In a way, it is thus what professional caregivers want for residents 
and for themselves. If wanting can be aligned, the situation is signifi-
cantly more pleasant for both parties involved.
6. In this chapter, I focused on those situations in which residents want 
something else than the care worker(s) in care encounters that centre 
around activities of daily living (ADL). These particular situations are 
characterised mostly by a resident not wanting to do what the care worker 
has to ‘get done’: getting residents up, bathing and dressing them. I have 
chosen these situations because they most clearly bring out how wanting 
is negotiated in care encounters. However, in focusing on ADL care, my 
writing seems to suggest that residents merely refuse and hardly actively 
want anything. This is not the case in practice: residents want many 
things, some of which are equally ‘problematic’ for care workers (such as 
wanting to go home, contiuously wanting to go to the toilet or desiring 
intimacy with other residents. In those situations the family’s wishes may 
also play an important role, a party that I have not been able to include 
in this chapter). By the same token, the situations in which residents do 
not necessarily want anything, but care workers stimulate them to do so, 
are left out. Both this ‘wanting something’ and the ‘activation to want 
something’ warrant further exploration.
7. In English, a person is said to no longer have legal capacity or to be 
(legally) incapacitated.
8. The issue of admitting somebody to a nursing home against her will is 
more complex than can be accounted for within the scope of this chap-
ter. It must be noted here, however, that admission against somebody’s 
 A. Driessen
129
will is only possible if (a) somebody is endangering her own or other 
peoples’ safety, (b) this situation cannot be resolved without admission 
to a nursing home and (c) a BOPZ-indication is assigned [a designation 
assigned to the person by a medical professional under the law of 
‘Bijzondere Opnemingen in Psychiatrische Ziekenhuizen’ (Special 
admissions in psychiatric hospitals)] (cf. Rijksoverheid n.d.).
9. I build my argument with ethnographic material that I gathered during 
14 months of fieldwork in three Dutch care institutions between sum-
mer 2013 and fall 2015. In all three care institutions I met the residents, 
and observed and participated in their daily activities. Additionally, I 
observed and participated in care practices, helping care workers with 
their ADL- tasks on the wards during day, evening and night shifts. I 
conducted interviews with carers and family members. The analysis con-
sisted of a careful readings and re-readings of all interview transcripts and 
field notes. I coded the data for recurring themes, using NVivo qualita-
tive data analysis software. One of these themes is ‘daily wanting’ on the 
ward and how it was negotiated in care encounters, the analysis of which 
I present in this chapter. Ethical consent for the research was obtained 
from the Anthropology Ethics Board of the University of Amsterdam.
10. I deliberately choose the term ‘wanting’ over ‘agency’. While agency, 
most generally, refers to the ‘socioculturally mediated capacity to act’ 
(Ahearn 2001, p. 112), hence potentialities of action, I here discuss actual 
practices in which wanting is done, and thus actually takes place.
11. This approach is useful to make visible how people with dementia who 
can no longer express themselves in verbally coherent ways, are neverthe-
less actors in the world. However, it simultaneously makes invisible 
mixed motives and intentions. If, for example, a resident steps into the 
shower upon the urging of her care worker, this action could, instead of 
an enactment of the will, also be a way to please her, or to put an end to 
the conversation. These considerations cannot be grasped through the 
approach chosen.
12. The statement can be said to reflect a wider shift away from coercive 
measures in Dutch health care, and may thus have been related to the 
language used in culture change programmes aiming to change care 
workers’ attitude towards the use of coercion. At the same time, neglect, 
or the milder form of ignoring somebody, was less discussed. These situ-
ations (for instance, when a resident indicates that she wants to use the 
toilet, but care workers assert that ‘she does not really need to go, she just 
thinks she does’) merit more analysis.
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13. For purposes of brevity, I hereafter use ‘will-work’.
14. I chose to call the practice ‘will-work’ rather than ‘wanting-work’ because 
it allows me to put my writings in conversation with philosophical work 
on the will.
15. Interestingly, disability studies itself has been critiqued for putting care 
recipients into the same position (Winance 2010, p. 95).
16. For a wonderful analysis of repertoires in washing practices, see Jeannette 
Pols’s ‘Washing the citizen’ (Pols 2006).
17. This illustrates the entanglement of will-work and emotional labour, 
defined by Arlie Hochschild as the ‘management of feeling to create a 
publicly observable facial and bodily display’ (Hochschild 1983, foot-
note p. 7) which ‘requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to 
sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind 
in others’ (ibid., p. 7). Here, Leandra manages her own facial display to 
produce a happy state of mind in Ms Koch, who is then more likely to 
want a shower.
18. For an interesting reflection on deception and dementia, see ‘Nothing 
but the truth? On truth and deception in dementia care’ (Schermer 
2007).
19. On a critical note: it is important that care workers keep asking them-
selves whether the resident really cannot skip the shower, or really does 
not want to shower—if the answer is no to both, then the shower may 
just be postponed, therein aligning the care worker’s wanting with what 
the resident wants.
20. It goes without saying that the examples of creative negotiation provided 
here are not an exhaustive list. Whenever one ‘way of doing things’ did 
not work, care workers mostly tried another one, or combined them 
creatively. Therefore the list should not be seen as a scheme of possible 
actions, but rather to give an idea of how care workers improvise in situ-
ations in which residents’ wanting does not align with what caregivers 
believes to be good for the resident (and thus with what the care worker 
would want the residents to want as well).
21. Interestingly, asking and rearranging the order in which residents are 
helped during the morning shift can become part of the daily routine 
too, without clashing with the efficiency-based logic of work in today’s 
Dutch care homes. Indeed, investing time in doing will-work may thus 
even contribute to efficiency in some instances. As a care worker told me 
in response to a presentation of this chapter during a ‘Dialogue meeting’ 
[Dialoogbijeenkomst] organised by the Long Term Care and Dementia 
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research team I am part of, if a resident does not want to get dressed, 
time may be best spent ‘seducing’ that person into wanting to get dressed, 
rather than spending time in forcing the person into her clothes, as the 
latter action may be less pleasant for caregiver and care receiver, as well 
as more time consuming. 
22. Clearly, it is necessary to take into account that these are largely personal 
and cannot be transferred from one care worker to another in every case. 
Indeed, not all care workers put as much creativity into the negotiation 
with residents. For instance, when Joani told Lucia about the foot bath 
she had given to Mr Bakker, Lucia replied ‘I am not going to do that!’.
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